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5THE EFFECTS OF FRAMING, RISK, AND UNCERTAINTY ON 
CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARD A PUBLIC ACCOUNT: 
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
Justin E. Holz1
ABSTRACT
This paper uses laboratory evidence from four strategically equivalent 
voluntary contribution games to evaluate differences in contributions toward a 
public account due to framing, risk, and uncertainty. I test four hypotheses. (1) 
Individuals contribute more to a public account when the dilemma is framed as 
the mitigation of a public loss than the provision of a public good. (2) Individuals 
contribute more to a public account when the loss is certain than when faced with 
the risk of a loss. (3) Individuals contribute more to a public account when the loss 
is certain than when environmental uncertainty is associated with the public loss. 
(4) Individuals contribute more to a public account when the probability of loss 
is known than when the probability of loss is unknown. I find that contributions 
are greatest when the dilemma is framed as the mitigation of a certain public loss. 
Contributions diminish when environmental risk and uncertainty are introduced, 
but remain higher than for public good provision. Preliminary laboratory evidence 
suggests that government intervention may be more necessary in the provision of 
a public good than in the mitigation of a public bad. Furthermore, much of the 
debate surrounding optimal allocations of insurance and infrastructure investment 
seems to be the result of environmental uncertainty as opposed to strategic 
uncertainty. 
I. INTRODUCTION
 Decisions under risk and uncertainty frequently deviate from the risk 
neutral predictions associated with expected utility theory. Infrastructure and 
insurance markets provide two examples where policy makers find it difficult to 
accurately forecast benefits and costs often leading to inefficient decision making. 
Chichilnisky (2006) estimates that an investment of 18 billion dollars in New 
Orleans’ infrastructure prior to Hurricane Katrina could have averted a 200 billion 
dollar loss. Conversely, Viscusi (1996) estimates the cost of asbestos removal 
to be upwards of 104.2 million dollars per life saved2. Chichilnisky claims that 
our decision-making tools under uncertainty have failed. More precisely, she is 
referring to expected utility theory. Tversky and Kahneman (1986) argue that 
expected utility theory is fundamentally flawed, as it emerged as a normative 
model of the ideal decision maker instead of from a psychological analysis of risk 
and value. They claim that accounting for psychological preferences allows for a 
1  This thesis would not have been possible were it not for the Dr. and Mrs. William F. Railing Fund Fellowship 
for Faculty-Student Research in Economics and funds received from Pi Lambda Sigma. I am also indebted to my 
thesis advisor Dr. John Cadigan for his help and guidance as well as the Gettysburg College Economics Department 
and students in Econ 420 for their helpful comments and suggestions.  Feel free to contact me with any questions or 
comments at justin.eric.holz@gmail.com
2  Estimate was made in 1996 using 1984 dollars.
6better representation of decision making under risk. This paper uses the Voluntary 
Contributions Mechanism to examine decision making in the presence of definite, 
risky, and uncertain losses.
  The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (VCM) is a conventional 
experiment used to analyze decision making in the presence of a public good. In 
a VCM game, participants are endowed with a set amount of tokens or currency 
and then given the option to contribute a portion of their endowment toward the 
provision of a public good. The contribution is multiplied by some efficiency factor 
greater than one and then distributed evenly to all group members. The payoff to 
the group is greater than the sum of individual contributions, but the payoff to 
the individual is less than their contribution. The Pareto efficient outcome occurs 
when every player chooses to contribute their entire endowment into the group 
account, as this strategy maximizes the aggregate payoff. However, each player 
has incentive to defect from Pareto optimum and contribute nothing, causing free 
riding to become the unique dominant strategy of the game.
Choices in the VCM game emulate public policy decisions such as the 
provision of public parks, museums, police protection, or schools. The decisions 
made in the laboratory should reflect decisions made in these instances and results 
can be used to draw inferences about public choice on a much larger scale. The 
use of real monetary incentives reduces inaccuracies that occur when using 
hypothetical bids.
VCM games similar to those used in this paper have been studied 
extensively in the past (e.g., Fehr and Gätcher 1999; Holt and Laury 2002; Isaac 
and Walker 1988; Sonnemans and Schram 1998). However, the vast majority 
of existing research focuses on environments where contributions to the public 
account add to the wealth of subjects in a deterministic manner that is known to 
participants. In reality, most local public goods are provided to limit potential 
damages with risky or uncertain outcomes such as fire and police protection, 
infrastructure development, public defense, or health risk-reducing regulations. 
Experimental research incorporating risk and uncertainty is limited with 
few exceptions (e.g., McClelland et. al 1993; Gangadharan and Nemes 2009). In 
McClelland’s experiments individuals could choose whether or not to purchase 
insurance that protects from a loss at varying probabilities. While only a portion 
of the players with the highest bids were able to obtain the insurance, bidding did 
not benefit other players. Gangadharan and Nemes’ public good experiments add 
elements of environmental risk and uncertainty, but do so maintaining a positive 
framework. 
In order to capture the effects of framing, risk, and uncertainty with 
respect to voluntary contributions, this paper utilizes four treatments of the 
VCM game. These treatments include a standard positively framed VCM game, 
a variation where individuals contribute towards the mitigation of a public loss 
instead of the provision of a public good, and two treatments where individuals 
contribute to mitigate a potential public loss with a 50% chance of realization. In 
7one of these two treatments the probability of loss is known to participants and 
in the other treatment the probability is unknown. Group size and the marginal 
per capita return on contributions toward the public account are equivalent 
across all treatments. I find that there are statistically significant differences in 
contributions depending upon the framing of the dilemma, and whether or not risk 
or uncertainty are associated with the public loss. Contributions are greatest when 
the dilemma is framed as the mitigation of a definite public loss and diminish 
when environmental risk and uncertainty are introduced, but remain higher than 
contributions toward the provision of a public good.
In Section II, I provide a review of the literature and experimental 
methods used to examine similar topics. Section III presents the theoretical model 
and section IV translates the model into the experimental design. In Section V, 
I state the hypotheses to be tested. Section VI contains the statistical results of 
the experiment with respect to those hypotheses. In Section VII, I examine the 
limitations of the results. In Section VIII, I discuss the results and possibilities for 
future research. Complete instructions are available in the appendix.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
 Expected utility theory is based on four key assumptions: cancelation, 
transitivity, dominance, and invariance. While these assumptions are intuitively 
attractive, they are often violated and do not provide a realistic view of human 
decision making. Tversky and Kahneman (1986) discuss these assumptions and 
propose an alternative by modifying the value function to incorporate preferences 
that are anomalous in expected utility theory.
Cancellation claims that states of the world that yield equivalent 
outcomes, regardless of one’s choice, are eliminated. For example, suppose there 
are two different gambles, Gamble A and Gamble B. In Gamble A there is a 50% 
chance that x will be realized with nothing happening otherwise. In Gamble B 
there is a 50% chance that y will be realized with nothing happening otherwise. 
If x is preferred to y, then Gamble A will be preferred to Gamble B since the two 
gambles yield the same outcome if not realized. Under this assumption individuals 
make decisions based solely on states that yield different outcomes. Allais (1953) 
provides a counter example that is supported by an experiment by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979).
In this experiment subjects faced two paired lottery choice situations. 
In the first situation, individuals chose between having a 33% chance to gain 
$2,500, a 66% chance to gain 2,400, and a 1% chance to gain nothing (option A) 
or gaining $2,400 with certainty (option B). In the second situation, individuals 
chose between a 33% chance to gain $2,500 and a 67% chance to gain nothing 
(option C) or a 34% chance to gain $2,400 and a 66% chance to gain nothing 
(option D). Out of the 72 subjects, 82% chose option B over option A and 83% 
chose option C over option D, conflicting with the cancellation axiom.
8The transitivity assumption states that A is preferred to B whenever the 
utility gained by A is greater than the utility gained by B. For example, suppose 
one has three options: A, B, and C. If A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C, 
then A will be preferred to C. Loomes, Starmer, and Sugden (1991) found that this 
axiom does not hold up in the laboratory. In their experiment they constructed two 
sets of twenty choice problems. Subjects chose between A and B, then between B 
and C, then between A and C where options A, B, and C were all random lotteries 
with different expected values, returns, and probabilities of return. One option 
used was a 30% chance of gaining $18 and a 70% chance of gaining nothing 
(option A), a 60% chance of gaining $8 and a 40% of gaining nothing (option 
B), and a 100% chance of gaining $4 (option C). Individuals participating in the 
experiment consistently violated the transitivity axiom in a way that could not be 
explained by random error.
Dominance states that if option A provides more utility than option B in 
one state and at least as much utility as option B in all other states, then option A 
is dominant over option B. The dominant option should be chosen. Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) refuted the Dominance axiom with another experiment. Subjects 
considered the following two lotteries describing the percentage of marbles of 
different colors in each box and the amount of money they won or lost depending 
on the color of the randomly drawn marble. They were then asked to specify 
which lottery they preferred.
Option A
 90% white 6% red 1% green 1% blue 2% yellow
 $0 win $45     win $30 lose $15      lose $15
Option B
 90% white 6% red      1% green 1% blue      2% yellow
 $0 win $45     win $45 lose $10      lose $15
 In this example the dominance of option B over option A is transparent. 
The payoff of option B is at least as high as the payoff of option A, regardless of 
the color. All of the 88 participants chose option B over option A. Next, Tversky 
and Kahneman combined the outcomes for drawing red or green marbles in B 
and yellow and blue marbles in A and asked 124 subjects which lottery they 
preferred.
Option C
 90% white 6% red  1% green 3% yellow
 $0 win $45 win $30   lose $15
Option D
 90% white 7% red  1% green 2% yellow
 $0 win $45 lose $10 lose $15
 In this problem, the dominance of option D over option C is not 
transparent and 58% of the participants chose C. This suggests that the dominance 
rule is obeyed when its application is transparent, but not when its application is 
masked.
9Finally, invariance states that different representations of payoff 
equivalent dilemmas will yield the same preferences. Refuting Invariance, 
McNeil et al. (1982) present a study of preferences between two potential medical 
treatments, surgery and radiation therapy. They used a survey containing statistical 
information about the effects of treating lung cancer using two different frames. In 
the first frame, the statistics were given in terms of survival rates and in the second 
frame statistics were given in terms of mortality rates. Respondents indicated their 
preferred treatment.
 Radiation therapy had a higher mortality rate (lower survival rate) than 
the surgery treatment after the end of five years and the expected survival/mortality 
rates were equal across treatments, but the respondents’ preferences were not. 
Only 18% of the respondents preferred radiation therapy in the survival frame, 
while 44% of the respondents preferred radiation therapy in the mortality frame. 
Results were similar for physicians, business students, and the clinic patients, 
refuting the invariance assumption.
Instead of using a weighted average of potential outcomes and their 
respective probabilities, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argued that individuals 
make decisions by evaluating alternative prospects with respect to a subjective 
reference point. In this model people are risk averse in the domain of gains and 
risk seeking in the domain of losses. One criticism of Kahneman and Tversky’s 
work is the use of hypothetical bids as opposed to real monetary incentives. 
However, decades of experimental research finds that their proposed challenges 
to expected value theory hold up when using monetary incentives.
Gangadharan and Nemes (2009) define a risk as a situation where all 
possible future outcomes and the probabilities of those outcomes are known. 
Examples include the chance that a building will catch on fire, a crime will 
be committed, or that a person will be involved in a car accident. In these 
instances the law of large numbers allows for the extrapolation of probabilities 
of occurrence. Knowledge of these probabilities allow for a risk to be mitigated 
using infrastructure investment, insurance, and laws or regulations. 
Uncertainty refers to the case in which outcomes are known, but the 
probabilities associated with those outcomes are not known, or impossible to know. 
A further distinction is made between ‘strategic’ and ‘environmental’ uncertainty. 
Environmental uncertainty refers to cases in which the probability distribution 
of potential losses is not known. Examples include terrorist attacks, rare natural 
disasters, and climate change. In these cases, it is not clear what the optimum 
group action is regardless of how individuals respond. Strategic uncertainty refers 
to the unknown probability distribution of potential decisions made by others. 
Gangadharan and Nemes (2009) investigate differences in the perception 
of risks and uncertainties when making decisions about private and public 
goods. In their experiment subjects received an endowment and chose between 
contributing to a private account and a group account. Their experiment contained 
seven different treatments: a standard public goods game, 2 treatments where there 
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is a known probability of obtaining the return for the private and public accounts, 
2 treatments were there is an unknown probability of obtaining the return for 
the private and public accounts, and 2 treatments were the participants have 
the opportunity to increase the probability of return from the private and group 
accounts. Each of the seven treatments lasted for 15 periods. Environmental risk 
and uncertainty varied along treatments, but strategic uncertainty was held constant. 
At the end of each period, subjects were told the aggregate level of contribution 
to the public good and their return from the private and public accounts. They find 
that environmental risk and uncertainty with respect to the provision of private 
and public goods is a significant factor when making decisions.
 McClelland et al. (1993) created an experiment to determine how 
individuals respond to different levels of environmental risk. Subjects faced risks 
of various magnitudes and probabilities with a constant group size of eight over 
eight periods. The magnitudes of the potential losses were $4 and $40 and the 
probabilities ranged from 0.1 to 0.9. The risk was operationalized using a bag 
containing 100 poker chips. Subjects received an endowment at the beginning 
of the experiment and each round the experimenters drew a chip from the bag. If 
a red chip was drawn the loss would be realized and if a white chip was drawn 
each individual would have a marginal increase in their wealth in order to keep 
them funded. An auction for insurance was held before each period. Participants 
entered a bid for insurance against the loss and the fifth highest bid became the 
reigning insurance price. The four players bidding higher than the reigning bid 
received insurance at that price.
Mean bids for both the $4 and the $40 treatments were close to the 
expected value at all probabilities except for the lowest (0.1). At this probability, 
the distribution of bids became bimodal (players chose to either ignore the risk 
entirely or overestimate its chance of occurrence). The most pronounced difference 
between the two treatments was a decrease in the amount of zero bids when the 
loss was increased to $40. McClelland claimed that results of the study may have 
been influenced by the gambler’s fallacy. That is a series of white chip draws 
would be accompanied by higher insurance bids and a series of red chip draws 
would be accompanied by lower insurance bids even though the probability that 
the loss would be realized was independent across periods.
McClelland claims that while the $4 and $40 losses do not approach those 
found in the high-consequence situations he is trying to model, the losses are high 
enough to entice players into acting as they would in those situations as individuals 
would all prefer to avoid the losses. In addition, he cited that players reacted with 
visible unhappiness when the losses occurred, providing some antidotal evidence 
that players were concerned with the earnings from the experiment. Furthermore, 
Smith and Walker (1993) found that real monetary rewards limit deviations from 
expected utility theory. Providing evidence that using monetary incentives instead 
of hypothetical bids will cause the decisions made in experiments to approach 
decisions made in similar real world situations.
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Sonnemans and Schram (1998) provide laboratory evidence that the 
framing of a dilemma as a public good or a public bad has a significant impact 
on the decision making processes of the subjects involved. Their experiment 
consisted of several periods with two different frames. The first frame was a 
provision of a public good that would only occur if investment into the public 
account exceeded a certain threshold. The second frame was prevention of a 
public bad in which individuals could withdraw resources from a public pool 
yielding negative externalities to the other group members. Both of the frames 
were made strategically equivalent.
They did not find a statistically significant difference in decision making 
between frames in the initial periods; however, differences developed during the 
game. Differences in the observed behavior from expected utility theory could not 
be explained by differences in value orientation. This is largely because they did 
not have an a priori way of determining the subjective reference point of those 
participating. The experiment also tests the Pruitt hypothesis that subjects will 
perceive themselves to be more interdependent in step level public goods games 
than in the step level public bads games. The Pruitt hypothesis was not refuted; 
although it was unable to explain why differences in cooperation between the two 
frames increased over the periods.
Their explanation for the differences in decisions over time was learning. 
When players were dissatisfied with their choices in previous periods, they 
modified their decisions in the new periods. Most of this dissatisfaction arose 
from inequity aversion on the behalf of the contributors as subjects had a greater 
distaste for contributing to a public good or prevention of a public bad when the 
contribution was so small that they did not reach the threshold than when their 
decision was not necessary to reach the threshold.
My design synthesizes the negative frame similar to that in Sonnemans 
and Schram (1998) and the environmental risk and uncertainty elements found 
in some treatments of Gangadharan and Nemes (2009). Unlike Sonnemans and 
Schram (1998), I incorporate elements of environmental risk and uncertainty. 
Unlike Gangadharan and Nemes (2009), the environmental risk and uncertainty 
treatments are framed negatively. Each treatment is a single period. Since each 
treatment is strategically equivalent, differences in contributions towards the 
public account should be the result of the frame and whether or not environmental 
risk or uncertainty exists in the treatment. 
III. MODEL
The four treatments use the payoff function found in equation 1. Each treatment 
is strategically equivalent3.
3  In a strict sense the first two treatments are strategically equivalent and the second two treatments are 
strategically equivalent, but the ex post payoff in the environmental risk and uncertainty treatments are slight 
modifications designed to keep the payoff reasonable.
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where  is the payoff to player . Each participant is endowed with mi and 
chooses to contribute xi into a public account. L represents the loss faced by the 
group, b represents the efficiency factor of contribution, Σgi is the sum of the 
contributions from other group members, and n is the number of participants 
in a group. In the environmental risk and uncertainty treatments the loss has a 
probability of occurrence equal to . If the loss is not realized any contributions 
made to mitigate the public loss are forfeited. 
The public account is given by . making the public 
account non-rival and non-excludable. In addition, , so individuals can only 
benefit from the contributions of others, making the public account a public good. 
For all treatments, . Therefore, it is impossible for participants to leave 
the experiment with less money than they entered with. Each individual must 
choose a value of  between 0 and 6. Participants view each treatment as a utility 
maximization problem represented by the following equation.
Since, , utility is maximized at  regardless of 
the contribution of the other group members.  is the unique dominant 
strategy of the game. The aggregate payoff function is given below in equation 3. 
Introducing a probability to the loss and public account terms does not alter the 
dominant strategy of the game.
Since, , group utility is maximized when each player 
chooses to invest everything into the public account . Notice that while 
individuals benefit from cooperation and suffer from defecting, the game provides 
incentives for individuals to choose the inefficient strategy of defecting. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
 The laboratory experiments were conducted in two sessions involving 12 
and 16 participants, respectively4 for a total of 28 observations; 25 observations 
were used. In each of these sessions, decision-making scenarios differed in framing, 
probability of loss, and knowledge of the probability of loss. At the beginning of 
each treatment subjects were placed randomly in anonymous groups of four. At 
the end of each period, subjects learned the aggregate level of contribution to the 
public account; but were not told the individual contribution of each other group 
member. Subjects were also told their payoff from each treatment. 
The baseline treatment was a positively framed VCM game. Equation 4 
represents the expected payoff of each group member with the loss that the group 
4  Participants were undergraduate students taking Game Theory or Advanced Topics in Microeconomics 
seminar at Gettysburg College. Three of the observations in the second session were excluded from the final data. 
Two of these observations consisted of the people who ran the experiment and the other subject was omitted due to 
participation in the previous session. Participation of these individuals was necessary to produce balanced groups. 
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faces, , equal to 0. The first variation is the negatively framed treatment where 
the loss is equal to -$24. Investing $1 into the public account decreases the loss 
to each group member by $0.40. The endowment in this treatment was increased 
to $16. The expected payoff for the negatively framed treatment is described in 
Equation 5. 
The third and fourth treatments were also negatively framed with an 
endowment of $16. The probability of loss in these treatments was equal to 0.5. 
In order to determine if the loss is realized, a poker chip was drawn from a bag 
containing 50 red chips and 50 white chips. If a red chip was drawn, the loss 
would be realized, if a white chip was drawn, the loss would not be realized. 
If the loss was not realized, all money invested into the public account would 
be lost. In the environmental uncertainty treatment the probability of loss was 
unknown to participants. However, they were shown that both a red chip and 
a white chip existed in the bag making it possible for the loss to occur and the 
loss to not occur. The expected payoff functions of the environmental risk and 
uncertainty treatments are described in equations 6 and 7, respectively. Notice 
that the efficiency factor was increased to 3.2 to preserve the marginal per capita 
return on contributions.
The order of the treatments was the environmental uncertainty treatment, 
the environmental risk treatment, the negative frame treatment, and then the 
positive frame treatment. Subjects were told prior to the experiment that upon 
completion they would be paid for one of the four treatments to be determined 
randomly by the flip of two coins in front of the students. 
V. HYPOTHESES
In this paper, I tests four hypotheses. (1) Individuals contribute more to a 
public account when the dilemma is framed as the mitigation of a public loss 
than the provision of a public good. (2) Individuals contribute more to a public 
account when the loss is certain than when faced with the risk of a loss. (3) 
Individuals contribute more to a public account when the loss is certain than 
when environmental uncertainty is associated with the public loss. (4) Individuals 
contribute more to a public account when the probability of loss is known than 
when the probability of loss is unknown.
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The results from Sonnemans and Schram (1998) provide some reason to believe 
that the quantities contributed toward the public account in the positively framed 
treatment and the negatively framed treatment will be statistically significant in 
difference from each other. Prospect theory suggests that contributions will be 
higher in the negative treatment. The payoff from contributing in the public account 
in the negatively treatment is framed as prevention of a loss. Since individuals 
weigh losses heavier than gains, contribution in the negative treatment is seen as 
having greater return than contribution in the positive treatment.
Hypothesis 2 stems from the reflection effect described in Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979). The reflection effect states that individuals are risk-averse in the 
domain of gains and risk-seeking in the domain of losses. The risk treatment is 
framed as mitigation of a probabilistic loss, so participants should also choose to 
invest less to the public account than when the loss is certain.
Gangadharan and Nemes (2009) find that when the probability distribution of 
the environmental risk is unknown, individuals tend to be “optimistic” and predict 
that the desired outcome will be realized. Since individuals should all prefer a 
higher payoff to a lower payoff, the desired outcome should be the loss not being 
realized. Therefore, contributions toward the public account should be lower in 
the environmental uncertainty treatment than in the negatively framed treatment. 
In the environmental risk treatment, the probability of loss is clearly defined 
and individuals are therefore able to evaluate the expected value of the loss. 
The optimism effect should also cause the investment levels to be higher in the 
environmental risk treatment than in the environmental uncertainty treatment. 
Hypotheses will be tested using t-tests, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, and an 
OLS regression. Hypothesis 1 would be supported by statistically significant 
differences in the average contribution in the negative and positive treatments 
with a greater average contribution in the negative treatment. Also, a positive 
and statistically significant coefficient on the dummy variable representing the 
negatively framed treatment would support this hypothesis. Hypothesis 2 would 
be supported by mean contributions in the environmental risk and negatively 
framed treatment being statistically significant in difference from each other 
with the average contribution being greater in the negatively framed treatment. A 
coefficient on the dummy variable representing the environmental risk treatment 
that is statistically significant and greater than the coefficient on the negatively 
framed treatment dummy variable would also support this hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3 would be supported by the mean contribution in the negative 
treatment being statistically significant in difference from and greater than the 
mean contribution in the environmental uncertainty treatment. The dummy 
variable representing the environmental uncertainty treatment having a statistically 
significant coefficient that is greater than the coefficient on the dummy variable 
representing the negatively framed treatment would also support this hypothesis. 
Mean contribution in the environmental risk treatment that is greater and 
statistically significant in difference from mean contribution in the environmental 
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uncertainty treatment would support hypothesis 4. A statistically significant 
coefficient on the environmental risk dummy that is greater than the coefficient of 
the environmental uncertainty dummy would also support this hypothesis.
VI. RESULTS
A. Overview
Figure 1 reports the amount of strong free riders in each treatment. 
Following the definition used in Isaac and Walker (1988), strong free riders are 
participants that chose to contribute less than one third of the Pareto efficient 
contribution into the public account . The vast majority of the subjects 
in the positively framed treatment chose to invest nothing. While free riding did 
not disappear entirely in any of the treatments, it is much less prevalent. Isaac 
and Walker (1988) found in their public good experiment that the level of strong 
free riders tends to increase over periods. In this experiment the trend is not as 
distinct.
Figure 1
Figure 2 presents the distribution of contribution toward the public 
account over each treatment. Using the negative frame, more contributions 
approached the Pareto optimum than in any other treatment. The data suggests 
that individuals are more likely to cooperate when faced with a public loss than a 
public gain. As environmental risk is introduced into the loss, the amount of Pareto 
efficient contributions falls by 85%. Comparatively, Pareto efficient contributions 
fall by only 57% when the probability of loss is uncertain. The distribution of 
contributions in the uncertainty treatment does not seem to indicate optimism. If 
individuals predicted the desired outcome, then one would expect the majority 
of contributions to approach zero; however, in this treatment many individuals 
contributed slightly over one-third of the Pareto efficient amount
16
Figure 2
 
Table 1 presents the average contributions to the public account for 
individuals and as a group in dollars and as a percentage of maximum possible 
investment. The average contribution toward the public account is five times 
greater when the dilemma is framed negatively than when the dilemma is framed 
positively. When environmental risk or uncertainty is introduced to the negative 
frame, average contributions fall by approximately 20% of the endowment with the 
decline being slightly more distinct with environmental risk than environmental 
uncertainty. 
It is clear from these results that the framing of the dilemma and whether 
environmental risk or uncertainty is associated with potential losses has a significant 
impact on contribution towards public account. This data supports hypotheses 
1, 2, and 3, but refute hypothesis 4. Statistical tests for significance reinforce 
these results. Table 2 contains pairwise t–tests for significant difference in the 
means across treatments as well as Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. The results for the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are presented in parenthesis under the results for the 
t-tests. These two measures of significance are particularly attractive as require 
minimal statistical assumptions. Both tests find that all treatments are statistically 
significant in difference from each other at the 10% level of significance. 
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Table 1
Individual Group Sum
Total Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. 
Dev
Positive Frame 15 0.60 (10%) 1.38 2.2 (9.1%) 2.66
Negative Frame 78 3.12 (52%) 2.57 11.56 (48%) 4.44
Environmental Risk 41 1.64 (27%) 1.80 6.36 (26%) 3.69
Environmental Uncertainty 51 2.04 (34%) 2.03 7.84 (32%) 3.68
Table 2
Pairwise T-Tests and Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests
Treatment Positive Frame Negative Frame Environmental 
Risk
Negative Frame -4.178***
(-3.388)***
-- --
Environmental Risk -2.355**
(-2.969)***
3.997***
(3.427)***
--
Environmental 
Uncertainty
-2.879**
(-3.117)***
3.038**
(2.757)***
-1.922*
(-1.800)*
*Difference is significant at the 10% level, ** difference is significant at the 
5% level, and *** difference is significant at the 1% level. Wilcoxon signed-
rank test results in parenthesis. 
B. Econometric Results
 The following multivariate regression model evaluates the contribution of 
individuals to the public account, , as a function of three dummy variables. The 
first variable, , is equal to 1 if contribution was made in the negatively framed 
treatment and 0 otherwise. The second variable, , is equal to 1 if contribution 
was made during the environmental risk treatment and 0 otherwise. The last 
variable, , is equal to 1 if contribution occurred during the environmental 
uncertainty treatment and 0 otherwise. The regression uses ordinary least squares 
with the functional form given below in equation 8. A summary of the results are 
reported in Table 3.
 
  
  
The omitted dummy variable is contributions made during the positively 
framed treatment. The coefficients of all of the variables are statistically 
significant in difference from zero at the 10% level of significance. At the 5% 
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level the coefficient on the environmental risk dummy is no longer statistically 
significant. The R2 value in this regression is very low, 0.17, but statistically 
significant in difference from zero. Moreover, low R2 values are not unusual in 
VCM experiments because of the innate randomness surrounding the participant’s 
decisions. 
 The most striking result is that using a negative frame as opposed to a 
positive frame increases the predicted value of the contribution by $2.52. This 
supports the evidence found using t-tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests and the 
hypothesis that individuals will contribute more to mitigate a public bad than they 
would to provide a public good.
 The introduction of environmental risk or uncertainty to the mitigation 
of a public bad reduces the contribution, while remaining greater than contribution 
for provision of a public good. It is possible that individuals chose to invest less 
in the environmental risk and uncertainty treatments because of risk-seeking 
preferences. Decisions are more cooperative with uncertain losses than when the 
probability of the loss is well defined. The relative magnitudes of the coefficient 
estimates support Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, but refute hypothesis 4.
Table 3
Regressor Coefficient Estimate
2.52***
(0.56)
1.04*
(0.56)
1.44**
(0.56)
Constant 0.6
(0.137)
R2 0.17
F 0.0003
Observations 100
*Coefficient is significant at the 10% level, ** coefficient is significant at the 
5% level, and *** coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
VII. LIMITATIONS
The claim that contributions toward a public account depend on framing, 
risk, and uncertainty is supported by the laboratory evidence obtained in this 
study. However, decades of previous VCM research document that learning 
occurs in experiments similar to mine, which could cause the explanatory power 
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of framing, risk, and uncertainty to appear greater than it actually is. Running 
these 4 treatments with the same subjects causes the results to be statistically 
interdependent. However, this was a deliberate and necessary design choice made 
to reduce the cost of the experiments and adhere to time constrains. In addition, 
previous research documents decay in contributions using the same treatment 
over several periods. Each period in my experiment is a new treatment.
Figure 3 shows the average individual contribution for each treatment. 
Overall, there is a decay trend similar to that found in Isaac and Walker (1988). 
The decay appears to be linear; however, average individual contribution in the 
negatively framed treatment is an outlier. If learning was the only effect causing 
differences in contributions across treatments, this trend would not be seen. 
Moreover, the results of the experiment are not indicative of the gambler’s fallacy. 
The potential loss in the first treatment was not realized in either of the sessions. 
If the participant’s were falling victim to the gambler’s fallacy, one would expect 
an increase in the amount invested into the public account from treatments 1 to 2, 
predicting the loss to be realized in the second treatment. On average this trend 
was not present, so changes in individual contribution cannot be explained by the 
gambler’s fallacy.
Figure 3
Sonneman and Schram (1998) found that subjects altered their behavior 
when unsatisfied with the results in the previous period. For that experiment, 
dissatisfaction was seen if the threshold level of the public good was not reached. 
In this experiment, subjects may be dissatisfied with other group members 
contributing small portions of their endowment toward the public account. Two 
OLS regression models, given in equations 9 and 10, are used to test for learning 
in the experiment.
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where  is the contribution to the group account made by other group 
members in the previous period. A summary of the results follow in table 4.
Table 4
                                         
Regressor Coefficient Estimate Coefficient Estimate
0.28**
(0.11)
0.477***
(0.09)
-.014
(0.07)
0.13**
(0.06)
-- 3.66***
(0.54)
-- 1.85***
(0.51)
Constant 1.25**
(0.54)
-1.94***
(0.67)
R2 0.08 0.44
F 0.052 0.000
Observations 75 75
*Coefficient is significant at the 10% level, ** Coefficient is significant at the 
5% level, and *** Coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
Individual contribution in the previous period has statistically significant 
effect on the predicted value of contributions to the public account in the current 
period in both of the regression models. In both of these models the coefficient 
estimate is less than one. This suggests that learning occurs during the experiment 
and that the learning is in the form of decay found in previous work. The 
contribution of other group members toward the public account in the previous 
treatment does not have a statistically significant impact on the contribution of 
the individual in the current treatment in the first regression model. However, 
the coefficient is statistically significant in the second model. Overall, the first 
model is not statistically significant while the second model is jointly significant. 
Controlling for learning, both the coefficient estimates for the negatively framed 
treatment and the environmental risk treatment are still statistically significant5. 
5  The residuals of both of the models are not normally distributed and plagued with other violations of the 
Gauss-Markov assumptions making their results unreliable.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
 The number of strong free riders in each treatment as well as the distribution 
of individual contributions in each treatment supports the claim that the framing 
of the dilemma and whether or not environmental risk or uncertainty is associated 
with the potential loss has a statistically significant impact on contribution 
toward the public account. Statistical tests as well as an OLS regression find that 
contributions across all treatments are statistically significant in difference from 
each other. Individuals contribute more to a public account when the dilemma is 
framed negatively than positively. Contribution is also greater when the loss to 
the group is certain than when there is a probability of loss (known or unknown). 
My hypothesis that individuals would contribute less to a public account when the 
probability of loss was unknown than when the probability of loss was known was 
not supported by laboratory evidence. This could be due to 0.5 probability chosen 
for environmental risk. McClelland et al. (1993) provide reason to believe results 
may be different at different probabilities. 
Two possible concerns regarding the validity of the results are the small 
sample size and that all of the treatments were done in succession with the same 
group of participants causing the results to be statistically interdependent. Similar 
VCM research documents decay in contributions over time in multi-period 
environments. Decay found in previous research occurs when experiments run 
the same treatment over a series of periods. In this experiment, each period is a 
new treatment. In addition, these design choices were deliberate and necessary 
in order to reduce the cost of the experiments and to adhere to time constraints. 
Contributions in the negative frame treatment deviate from the overall downward 
trend in contributions. When controlling for learning, coefficient estimates for the 
negative frame and environmental risk treatments remained statistically significant 
in difference from zero.
Another possible area of concern is the necessary trivialization of losses. 
The losses in this experiment do not approach those from a hurricane, terrorist 
attacks, or asbestos poisoning; however, it is not possible to replicate high-
loss situations in the laboratory. The use of real monetary incentives should be 
sufficiently high so that each participant makes decisions in a way analogous to 
much larger losses. 
Assuming these concerns are not a significant factor in determining 
individual contribution, these results suggest that individuals are able to reach 
more cooperative decisions when faced with public losses than when faced with 
public good provision. In terms of public policy, this suggests that it may be 
more necessary for the government to intervene to provide public goods than 
protection against public bads. Individuals are less likely to make Pareto efficient 
contributions when environmental risk or uncertainty is involved. Moreover, 
difficulties in reaching efficient levels of infrastructure and insurance investment 
are largely due to environmental uncertainty as opposed to strategic uncertainty. 
Unlike Gangadharan and Nemes (2009), an optimism effect was not seen for losses 
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with an unknown probability. When environmental risk was defined at 0.5, subjects 
appear to be more risk-seeking. It may also be necessary for the government to 
intervene in instances such as natural disasters (where the probability distribution 
of losses is not well defined) or public health hazards (where aggregate losses 
are well-defined). Also, in VCM type fundraising may be most effective when 
phrased as mitigation of a certain public loss. 
Two interesting questions arise from these results that I will pursue in 
future research. First, contributions when the probability of loss was known to be 
0.5 were less and statistically significant in difference from contributions in the 
negative frame. However, it is possible that the probability associated with the loss 
influenced decision making. Replicating the experiment using probabilities ranging 
from 0.1 to 0.9 would add some robustness to these results and better examine 
how decisions are made in low risk high-consequence scenarios as compared 
to high risk low-consequence scenarios. Second, one of the most interesting 
features of public dilemmas such as climate change is that the probability of the 
loss’s occurrence is endogenous to the actions of those facing the losses. Private 
consumption and pollution emission today increases public damages in the future. 
Further experiments could examine the actions of individuals in situations where 
private investment in the current period increases the probability of potential 
losses in later periods. 
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—APPENDIX—
Instructions (Negatively framed Public Good)6:
This is an experiment in decision making. The instructions are designed to inform 
you of the types of decisions you will be making and the results of those decisions. 
All earnings you make during the experiment will be totaled and paid to you in 
cash, privately, at the end of the experiment. If you have any questions concerning 
the instructions feel free to raise your hand and one of the experiment monitors 
will assist you. 
You will be randomly and anonymously placed in a group with 4 members (you 
and three other participants). Each member of the group begins the experiment 
with an endowment of $16. 
Each member of your group will decide how much to allocate to a ‘group account.’ 
In particular, you must choose how many dollars to allocate to the group account 
with a minimum of $0 and a maximum of $6. Allocations must be made in $1 
increments. In other words, you must choose among the following allocations to 
the group account: $0, $1, $2, $3, $4, $5, or $6. The amount you choose to allocate 
to the group account will be deducted from your endowment. Each member of 
the group will be informed of the total amount allocated to the group account, 
but will not receive any information about the specific choices made by any 
individual. Since group pairings are anonymous and individual allocations will 
not be revealed, your decision will be confidential. In other words, no member of 
your group or any other participant in the experiment will be able to identify your 
allocation decision. 
The return from the group account will be determined as follows. The account 
begins with a deficit of $24. Each dollar that is contributed to the group account 
(by you or any other member of your group) will be multiplied by 1.6. Thus the 
final amount in the group account will be:
-$24 + 1.6 * (Total Group Contributions).
The return from the group account (which may be either positive or negative) will 
be split evenly among the group members. This means you will receive ¼ th of the 
final amount in the group account. 
To summarize, your payoff from the experiment will be determined as follows:
$16 – your contribution to the group account + ¼ * (-$24 +1.6*(Total Group 
Contributions))
6  Copies of the instruction for other treatments are available upon request from the author.
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Another way to think about this decision is as follows. You are part of a group 
with 4 people. Initially, your group has to pay a cost of $24, of which your share 
is $6. You can invest in a group account to lower the cost your group must pay. 
Every dollar you invest lowers the group’s cost by $1.60, meaning that for every 
$1 you invest your cost decreases by $0.40, and so does the cost of each other 
member of your group.
 
If you have questions, please raise your hand at this time, and an experiment 
monitor will assist you. Otherwise, simply follow the instructions on your 
computer screen. Once you have completed all of your decisions, please wait for 
the experiment to conclude. The experiment monitors will then call participants 
out of the room one at a time and pay you your earnings from the experiment.
